İran Araştırmaları Merkezi (İRAM) İngilizce Akademik Okumalar Grubu, Perşembe günü gerçekleşecek olan derste aşağıdaki iki metinden birisi incelenecektir.
of fissures within the Iraqi elite with the goal of undermining Iranian dominance in the country
Wednesday 29 November 2017 12:45 UTC
Saudi Arabia is attempting to mend its historically antagonistic relations with Iraq's Shia, at Iran's expense.
In early November, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched a domestic shake-up, as well regionally, ratcheting up tensions with Iran, and sabre-rattling against the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
READ MORE ►
However, as Riyadh seemed to stoke tensions with the region's Shia, there had been a quieter Saudi campaign unfolding to co-opt Iraq's Shia.
While Riyadh has maintained relations with Iraq's Arab Sunni politicians and tribes in the past, beginning in the summer of 2017 it has forged connections with Iraq's Arab Shia political elite as well. In hindsight, this Saudi strategy has sought to undermine the relationship between Shia Iran and its co-religionists in Iraq.
The regional cold war
Emile Hokayem wrote recently in the New York Times that the Saudi crown prince's actions to ratchet up tensions in Yemen and Lebanon are counterproductive. In the Middle East, he writes, "the balance of power is determined in Syria and Iraq".
Saudi Arabia has attempted, belatedly, to project its influence in Iraq. The first major event that signalled the kingdom's return to Iraq occurred in 2015 when it reopened its embassies in Baghdad and in the capital of the Kurdish Regional Government, Erbil, restoring diplomatic relations that had been severed after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
However, it appeared to take two more years before Riyadh had finally come to terms with a Shia-led government in Baghdad, and open up a dialogue on the official, bilateral level in 2017. The thaw in this relationship was represented by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi visitingRiyadh in June on a Middle East tour that also included Iran and Kuwait.
Mohammed bin Salman (right) and Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in Jeddah (AFP)
This visit was a high-profile meeting between Iraq's Shia head-of-state and the Saudi monarchy. However, what was more surprising over the summer was the semi-official Saudi-Shia diplomacy that ensued.
Saudi-Iraqi Shia diplomacy
In mid-July, Iraqi Interior Minister Qasim al-Araji visited Saudi Arabia to discuss security and intelligence cooperation, as well as easing visa restrictions for Iraqis wanting to visit Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage. Al-Araji belongs to the Badr Organisation, an armed political faction in Iraq that has very close ties to Iran, Saudi Arabia’s regional rival.
A few weeks later, Iraqi Shia leader Muqtada Sadr, who holds no official position in the Iraqi government, visited Mohammed bin Salman, a meeting which may have encouraged Riyadh to open land and air links with Iraq.
Sadr's visit served his own domestic political agenda. He had criticised Iran's influence on Iraq's domestic politics, and further challenged Tehran's sway in Iraq when he called for the demobilisation of the Iraqi Shia militias, many of which serve as Iranian proxies.
Saudi Arabia's attempt to engage in dialogue with Sadr serve as Riyadh's attempt to placate the Iraqi Shi’a leader’s response to domestic Saudi affairs
Thus, his interests do have resonance with Saudi foreign policy goals. With Sadr visiting Saudi Arabia, Riyadh was able to send a message to Tehran that it can also forge connections with Iraq’s Shia, depriving the Islamic Republic of hegemonic influence over its Iraqi coreligionists.
Second, an ulterior motive behind forging relations with Iraq's Shia occurred in August, just after these visits. Saudi Arabia had its own domestic crisis as it deployed military forces into the predominantly Shia town of Awamiya, destroying much of the old city in the process.
Shias make up around 15 percent of Saudi Arabia's population, but they reside primarily in the eastern, oil-rich al-Hasa province on the Gulf.
Iraq's Shia, including Sadr, were vocally critical of Saudi Arabia's military deployment to Bahrain in 2011, to quell protests led by both Bahraini Shia and opposition Sunnis on the island. Sadr also denounced the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a Shia religious figure from Awamiya, on 2 January 2017.
Saudi Arabia’s attempt to engage in dialogue with Sadr serve as Riyadh’s attempt to placate the Iraqi Shi’a leader's response to domestic Saudi affairs.
Amidst this diplomatic campaign Saudi Arabia reopened its border crossing with Iraq in August, closed for 27 years since the Gulf crisis, and resumed direct flights to Baghdad.
Iraq's Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi attends the Arab League summit in Jordan on 29 March (Reuters)
Last week Saudi Arabia invited 100 Iraqi businessmen to visit Riyadh, part of a joint economic and coordination council, the first of its kind in the relations between the two countries.
The timing of these initiatives raises the question of what is the Saudi end game in improving the relations with Iraq’s Shia political elite.
A regional hegemon
Saudi Arabia has always sought to project itself as a regional hegemon claiming to protect the interests of a Sunni bloc in the region. With the blockade against Qatar, a fellow Gulf Arab Sunni neighbour, Riyadh has undermined the very alliance which it claims to lead.
Iran has taken advantage of these bilateral tensions by aiding Qatar during the blockade. While Iran is able to enhance its regional posturing via these intra-Sunni tensions, Saudi Arabia appears to be seeking out fissures in the relationship between Tehran and Iraq's Shia.
Despite this new round of diplomacy, Riyadh cannot compete with Iranian influence in Iraq. In addition to the vast network of Iranian-supported militias, Iran can offer financial largesse to parties and candidates in Iraq's upcoming parliamentary elections in 2018.
READ MORE ►
While Saudi Arabia does have financial resources at its disposal, it does not have the organisational links to Iraq's other Shia parties. Additionally, it is unlikely that any Iraqi Shia politician will accept Saudi aid in an election for fear of alienating voters.
Rather, the recalibration of Saudi policy to Iraq's Shia is most likely to make Iran feel uncomfortable.
Iran has been able to undermine the Qatar blockade, and undo Saudi aspirations in Syria and Yemen. From the Saudi perspective, courting Iraq's Shia politicians is one of the few remaining options the kingdom has in a regional cold war that it is escalating. It is also a sign that Riyadh is beginning to realise that it is losing that war.
- Ibrahim al-Marashi is Associate Professor of Middle East History at California State University San Marcos. His publications include: Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History (2008), The Modern History of Iraq (2017), and A Concise History of the Middle East (forthcoming).
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
Photo: Shia Popular Mobilisation Forces celebrate on the outskirts of Kirkuk (Reuters)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomes Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during a meeting in the Black Sea resort of Sochi on November 20 [Reuters/Mikhail Klimentyev]
The fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant seems to have ended. Although the armed group is unlikely to disappear, its territorial controlhas been almost completely wiped out after its two "capitals" - Mosul and Raqqa - were liberated and most of its territories in Iraq and Syria were recaptured.
In Syria, besides the few remaining areas under ISILcontrol, there is Idlib province which is dominated by Ha'yet Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusra Front). Russia, Iran and Turkey are likely to launch a joint operation against the HTS there and then divide the province into spheres of influence.
The rest of Syria is either under the control of the regime or the US-allied Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). Thanks to two years of Russian intervention and attacks by ISIL and HTS, a significant part of the real armed opposition was liquidated, and we can say that the period of active hostilities has come to an end. The issues of peace and stability have become much more important to Syrians than problems of power and the future political order.
As Syria enters a new de-escalation phase of the conflict, the role of Russia in it comes into question. Soon the Syrian regime will no longer need military backing as much as financial support. And that Russia might not be able to provide.
Russia's post-conflict strategy in Syria
Today, Bashar al-Assad can consider himself the "winner" in the civil war very much thanks to Russian backing and its military intervention. Yet, this does not necessarily guarantee Moscow a comfortable presence in post-war Syria.
In the course of the armed conflict, the value of Moscow for Damascus was the military assistance and deployment of its forces which played a key role in the military advances of the regime. But with the transition to the post-conflict period soon to begin, the significance of the military factor would steadily decrease, giving way to the financial and economic aspects of cooperation.
Russia, however, does not have the financial capacity to invest heavily in Syria after the end of the conflict.
Iran has already declared that it will assist Syria financially. In a recent telephone conversation with Bashar al-Assad, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani assured him that his country "is prepared to actively participate in Syria's reconstruction".
Russia, however, does not have the financial capacity to invest heavily in Syria after the end of the conflict. In this context, its positions in Syria no longer seem so convincing. This has forced Moscow to realise that alliances with Tehran and Ankara in Syria might not be so beneficial in the future and that it needs to find new allies for the post-conflict period. As a result, the Russian government has upped its efforts on keeping the negotiating process under its control to make sure it is not ousted from its position as kingmaker in Syria.
It is the desire to demonstrate its exclusivity and irreplaceability that dictated the latest Russian initiatives on Syria: from Vladimir Putin's statement about the need to hold the Congress of the Syrian people in Sochi to a series of meetings that the Russian president held last week with the leaders of Middle Eastern countries.
Particularly revealing in this respect was the "unexpected trick" with Bashar al-Assad showing up in Sochi. This was Assad's second trip out of his country since 2011; in 2015 he went again to Russia to meet Putin. For Moscow, the Syrian president is a kind of a "liquid asset", which the Russian leadership is trying to convert into diplomatic success. His visit was meant to reinforce Russia's monopoly over the Syrian file. It sent a clear message to the international community that Moscow holds the keys to Damascus and is the only patron of the regime able to push it to the negotiations table.
Immediately after the meeting, Putin hastened to share its results with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and the United States. And two days later, at a meeting with Rouhani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he demonstrated his "leading and guiding" role in the Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle.
The danger for Moscow is that at some point Damascus might stop responding to Russian pressure.
Despite its crucial role in the Syrian negotiating process, its resources and capabilities are clearly not enough to hold it. Russia needs another partner in Syria which is able to guarantee funds for reconstruction in the post-conflict period. And that partner needs to be willing to route the financial flows through Moscow.
The bigger problem is that Russia doesn't have much time to do this. Assad's regime could become even more intransigent as its "victory" solidifies and it might be even more difficult for Moscow to push it to sit down for negotiations.
Presidential adviser Bouthaina Shaaban and Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mikdad have already expressed their scepticism about the negotiation process under the auspices of the UN. The initial refusal of Damascus to participate in the negotiations in Geneva under false pretences signals that the Syrian regime is playing a waiting game.
The regime ultimately wants to hold negotiations only after the opposition is completely disarmed and after it makes sure that there is no interference "in the internal affairs of the country". Basically, it wants the opposition to capitulate and it is patiently waiting for it.
The danger for Moscow is that at some point Damascus might stop responding to Russian pressure. That would be a major loss for Russia.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Hiç yorum yok:
Yorum Gönder